AbstractAre demands for equality motivated by envy? Nietzsche, Freud, Hayek, and Nozick all thought so. Call this the Envy Objection. For egalitarians, the Envy Objection is meant to sting. Many egalitarians have tried to evade the Envy Objection. But should egalitarians be worried about envy? In this article, I argue that egalitarians should stop worrying and learn to love envy. I argue that the persistent unwillingness to embrace the Envy Objection is rooted in a common misunderstanding of the nature of the charge, what it reveals, and what can be said in response to it. I develop what Bernard Williams might call a vindicatory genealogy of envy, thereby allowing us to see that envy, rather than undermining egalitarian intuitions, can in fact play a distinct justificatory role (when it is fitting), which undermines the Envy Objection.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Iraqi society has experienced profound crises in its transition from a strong centralized state under secular Baʿth Party authoritarianism to a new weak but still authoritarian federal state that is dominated by Shiʿi Islamist parties and plagued by factionalism, open sectarian competition, and conflict. A comprehensive scrutiny of the country's recent historical ruptures and continuities that pertain to the relations between the state and religion in particular is still a desideratum in contemporary Iraq studies. The extent to which thirty-five years of Baʿthi dictatorship transformed and lastingly shaped Iraq's diverse religious landscape is still not yet fully understood. Following the US-led invasion, the former regime was well-remembered for its repression and atrocities against almost all segments of society, but its image and the long-held notion and memory of it as "atheist" and "antireligious" are increasingly being challenged. Moreover, sectarian conflicts and violence since 2005 reveal an ongoing conflict over the interpretive sovereignty and ownership of famous religious sites of memory, such as shrines and mosques, between the various factions in Iraq. Beginning with the Iran–Iraq War in 1980, the Baʿth regime lavishly sponsored Sunni and Shiʿi shrines and advertised them in its religious war propaganda all over the country as sites of memory for the Iraqi and Arab nation. Many of these religious sites were surrounded by a certain confessional ambiguity and constitute memorials and meeting places for Sunnis and Shiʿis equally. After the fall of the regime, this ambiguity sparked sectarian competition over these sites since both communities often associated with one and the same shrine quite different memories of the same saintly figure, or they disagreed about who was buried there. Radical jihadist Salafis, in turn, generally rejected them as un-Islamic and even associated them with the old regime from 2014 onward.
This study probes into the relationship between the state and Sufism in Iraq under the Arab Socialist Baʿth Party from 1968 to 2003. It investigates the gradual evolution of secular Baʿthist politics, from a stricter separation of religion and politics towards the increasing political incorporation of Islam with a strong and direct patronage of Sufism and Sufis in Iraq. On the basis of sources ranging from Iraqi daily newspapers, party publications, laws, biographies, ansāb literature, Sufi publications, and qualitative expert interviews, the thesis discovers how the Baʿth regime incorporated Sufism and the Sufis into its policies and how, in this way, it contributed to a revival of Sufism in the country. This is accomplished through a twofold approach, firstly, concentrating on a close, diachronic investigation of Baʿth religious politics, and secondly, focussing on the history of Sufism before and under the Baʿthist policies, both in the Arab and the Kurdish regions. First of all, I argue that the social and political transformations in Iraq between the Ottoman era of the late nineteenth century and the 1960s brought about a considerable decline of Sufism through the loss of status, influence, and popularity for Iraq's Sufis, and the demise of Sufi institutions. Afterwards, the analysis of Baʿthist politics shows how the state gradually contributed to the reversal of the previous decline: this began with strong material support for Kurdish Sufis in the north during the 1970s, then the nationwide support for Sufis, Sufi institutions and traditions and their incorporation into the religious propaganda during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and culminated with the official revival of Sufism during the Faith Campaign in the 1990s. Despite the Baʿth's intensive usage of Islam in politics, this thesis argues that the regime did not become Islamist. On the contrary, it deliberately promoted Sufism as an educational tool against the perceived moral decay in Iraq's crisis-ridden society, as a national Islam to stand against the spread of radical Wahhābism and Salafism, and to counteract sectarianism during the 1990s. While the Baʿth sought to form strategic alliances with loyal Sufis in a top-down approach, many Sufis, in turn, actively sought to form strategic alliances with the regime in order to pursue their own bottom-up interests. In spite of the Baʿth regime's severe repression, its targeted revival of Sufism brought with it new opportunities which were seized by many Sufis in order to actively pursue their own spiritual and social interests in Iraq and navigate through processes of change. ; Diese Studie erforscht das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Sufismus im Irak unter der Arabischen Sozialistischen Baʿth-Partei von 1968 bis 2003. Untersucht wird die schrittweise Entwicklung der säkularen Baʿth-Politik von der strikten Trennung von Religion und Politik hin zur politischen Einbindung des Islam mit starker Unterstützung von Sufismus und Sufis im Irak. Basierend auf der Analyse von irakischen Tageszeitungen, Parteiveröffentlichungen, Gesetzen, Biographien, ansāb-Literatur, Sufipublikationen, und qualitativen Experteninterviews, erforscht die Arbeit, wie das Baʿth-Regime Sufismus und Sufis in seine Politik integrierte und so zu einem Wiederaufleben des Sufismus im Land beitrug. Die Analyse folgt hierbei einem zweifachen Ansatz, der erstens auf eine diachrone Untersuchung von baʿthistischer Religionspolitik fokussiert und zweitens auf die Geschichte des Sufismus vor und unter der Baʿth-Herrschaft in den arabisch und kurdisch dominierten Regionen. Es wird zunächst argumentiert, dass die sozialen und politischen Transformationsprozesse im Irak zwischen der osmanischen Ära des späten neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und den 1960er Jahren einen beachtlichen Niedergang des Sufismus zur Folge hatten. Dieser Niedergang äußerte sich vor allem im Verlust von Status, Einfluss, und Popularität vieler Sufis im Irak, sowie durch den Niedergang und Verlust von Sufi-Institutionen. Die anschließende Analyse der Baʿth-Politik zeigt, wie der Staat schrittweise zu einer Umkehrung dieses Niedergangsprozesses beitrug: Dies begann mit starker materieller Unterstützung für kurdische Sufis im Norden während der 1970er Jahre, gefolgt von der landesweiten Unterstützung von Sufis, ihren Institutionen und Traditionen, und deren Einbindung in die religiöse Propaganda während des Iran-Irak Krieges in den 1980ern, und gipfelte in der offiziellen Wiederbelebung des Sufismus während der staatlichen Glaubenskampagne der 1990er Jahre. Die Studie argumentiert, dass das Baʿth-Regime, trotz des intensiven politischen Gebrauchs von Islam, selbst nicht islamistisch wurde. Im Gegenteil förderte das Regime während der 1990er vielmehr gezielt den Sufismus als moderates Erziehungsmittel gegen den wahrgenommenen moralischen Verfall der krisengeschüttelten irakischen Gesellschaft, als nationalen Islam gegen die Verbreitung von radikalem Wahhabismus und Salafismus, sowie als Gegenkraft gegen die konfessionelle und ethnische Spaltung der Nation. Während die Baʿth danach strebte für ihre politischen Zwecke strategische Allianzen mit loyalen Sufis zu bilden, suchten viele Sufis wiederum für ihre eigenen Interessen und Ziele aktiv strategische Allianzen mit dem Regime. Trotz der schweren Reppression durch den Staat brachte die gezielte Wiederbelebung des Sufismus so neue Möglichkeiten und Spielräume, die viele Sufis aktiv nutzten, um ihre eigenen spirituellen und sozialen Interessen zu verfolgen und erfolgreich durch Prozesse des Wandels hindurch zu navigieren.
